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Abstract
The term ‘political will’ is often conveniently used to explain the success or failure of any policy or programme. It has
emerged as the “sine qua non of policy success which is never defined except by its absence” (Hammergren, 1998, p. 12).
Therefore, a structured examination of the term is necessary to analyse social policy and programming. The Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), enacted by India’s United Progressive Alliance government
in 2005, offers a compelling case to examine the role of ‘political will’ in the formulation of a major programme. The evo-
lution of the MGNREGA, which has been described by the World Bank as the largest antipoverty state-run employment-
generation scheme anywhere in theworld (Dutta,Murgai, Ravallion, & van deWalle, 2014), depended significantly on lead-
ership and political commitment in the legislature and the executive, as well as their coordination and substantive engage-
ment with civil society, represented through non-governmental organisations and activists.We explore the complex power
relations between the diverse range of actors involved in theMGNREGA, and gauge the role of leadership and political will
in the formulation of theMGNREGA, as carried out by theUnited Progressive Alliance government between 2005 and 2014,
in contrast to the manner in which it was reframed and retained by its successor dispensation, the National Democratic
Alliance from 2014 onwards. We then examine the MGNREGA, utilising a framework which expands our understanding
of political will as being contingent upon leadership at the individual, collective and societal levels (Hudson, Mcloughlin,
Roche, & Marquette, 2018), thereby providing us with greater explanatory power.
Keywords
coalitions; developmental leadership; employment; framing; India; leadership; MGNREGA; policy formulation; political
leadership; social policy
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1. Introduction
Upon being elected in 2004, India’s United Progressive
Alliance (UPA), a coalition led by the Indian National
Congress party, began introducing various legally-
enforceable rights with a view to increase economic and
social opportunities for its citizens, of which the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, later renamed
as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was its flagship program.
The UPA:
Introduced numerous programmes to benefit poorer
groupswho had been largely ignored both by itsmain
rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP], which had led
a ruling coalition between 1998 and 2004, and by the
Congress itself in earlier periods. (Manor & Duckett,
2017, p. 306–307)
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The MGNREGA:
Sought to protect the livelihoods of the poor agricul-
tural labourers during periods of distress, by granting
adult members of every rural household the right to
demand [at least] 100 days of [guaranteed] unskilled
work at stipulated minimum wages from the state.
(Vijayabaskar & Balagopal, 2019, p. v)
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme that operates under the aforemen-
tioned Act, came into force in February 2006, following
the enactment of the MGNREGA in August 2005, and
it was phased-in across India in three steps in a “high-
ly non-random manner that prioritized economically
underdeveloped districts” (Zimmermann, 2013, p. 3).
After initially being implemented in the first 200 poorest
districts of India, the scheme was extended to the rest
of the country with 130 additional districts receiving it in
April 2007, and all remaining rural districts by April 2008
(Ministry of Rural Development, 2010).
MGNREGA has been described as the largest
antipoverty state-run employment-generation scheme
anywhere in the world (Dutta et al., 2014). It registers
270.5 million active workers, and reaches 693 out of
India’s 718 districts, spanning 265,067 Gram Panchayats,
which are elected village-level local self-governing insti-
tutions (Ministry of Rural Development, 2020a), that
are entrusted with rural development: “Work is provid-
ed in public works projects at the statutory minimum
wage notified for the programme by State Governments
that are responsible for implementing the [MGNREGA],”
and this “work must be made available within 15 days
of receiving an application to work, failing which, the
State Government is liable for paying an unemployment
allowance” (Dutta et al., 2014, p. xxiii). The MGNREGA
was initially conceptualized amongst civil society activists
in the state of Rajasthan in the early 2000s, recognizing
the need for a public works program to combat drought
(Chopra, 2011), and was eventually introduced by the
Indian National Congress-led central government in 2005.
Essentially it is a public works programme that is
planned through a bottom-up, decentralised process,
with half of the works implemented through Gram
Panchayats at the village-level (Chopra, 2011). It is a
demand-led Act, with resources transferred from the
central to state governments based on the demand for
employment in each state, assessed through periodical
surveys conducted by theGramPanchayats. The assured
employment for one hundred days at minimum wages
guaranteed by the MGNREGA to a rural household is
a right that can be expected, demanded and legally
enforced. In addition to short-term employment gen-
eration the MGNREGA also creates durable assets like
productive infrastructure for poverty alleviation (Second
Administrative Reforms Commission, 2006). Given that
theMGNREGA is demand-driven, there are no state-wise
allocations. Instead:
Releases are based on labour budget estimates pre-
pared at the start of the year and the actual demand
for work during the year…[and] total funds available
for [the MGNREGA] include [Government of India]
and state government releases, as well as, unspent
balances from previous years. (Accountability
Initiative, 2020a)
With the UPA government losing the 2014 Indian gener-
al election, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led
by the centre-right BJP came to power. The BJP’s ascen-
dance raised a number of question marks over whether
the MGNREGA would be continued, particularly since its
welfare narrative, focusing on ‘empowerment,’ pointedly
differed from the Congress’ which emphasised on ‘rights’
and ‘entitlements’ (Aiyar, 2018). Even though the BJP
maintained ideological opposition to the Congress’ con-
ceptualization of employment generation, and favoured
individual effort as opposed to state support, it has
not only retained the MGNREGA but has also overseen
its growth.
Figure 1 contains revised estimates of budgetary allo-
cations to the Ministry of Rural Development (in blue),
and allocations to the MGNREGA as a proportion of
the overall ministerial budget for each financial year
since the programme’s inception. It is clear that while
there has been some ebb and flow in allocations dur-
ing the UPA years up until 2014, there has since been
a broadly upward trend in allocations by the NDA since
FY 2014–2015. It must be noted that revised estimates
are used since they present amore accurate picture com-
pared to budget estimates, since:
Some of the estimates made by the government
might change during the course of the year, [and
that] once the year gets underway, some ministries
may need more funds than what was actually allocat-
ed to them in the budget, or the receipts expected
from certain sources might change. (Tiwari, 2019)
In terms of outcomes, both household-level and person-
wise employment indicators, as seen in Figure 2, have
similarly seen a broadly upward trend since the NDA
government took office in 2014, across the categories
of demand for work, allotment of work, and actual
numbers worked, save for a slight dip in total persons
demanding and being allotted work in FY 2017–2018.
MGNREGA employment data has been analysed here
from FY 2011–2012 up until FY 2019–2020, since compa-
rable categories of data for previous financial years are
not available, and figures for the current FY 2020–2021
are provisional, with data being available only for part of
the year on the MGNREGA Public Data Portal (Ministry
of Rural Development, 2020b).
Even though the employment data shows an over-
all upward trend since FY 2014–2015 in terms of total
demand, allocation, and actual work undertaken, met-
rics such as total person-days generated, and the total






































































Figure 1. Union expenditure budget of the Ministry of Rural Development for FY 2006–2007 to FY 2019–2020. Note:
Figures in Rupees crore (1 crore = 10 million) and are revised estimates (constructed from data in public domain). Source:
Accountability Initiative (2020b).
number of households reaching the prescribed 100-day
limit, provide a relatively mixed picture, as is clearly vis-
ible in Figure 3. The labour budget estimate under the
MGNREGA is contingent upon the amount of total cost
(towards wage, material, and administrative costs) to be
incurred while generating a person-day wage employ-
ment, and as such, this fact lends significance to the use
of person-days as an indicator. On the other hand, the
100-day limit for MGNREGA is a useful indicator as well,
and arguably a more representative measure of the pro-
gramme delivering on the letter and spirit of what the
MGNREGA guarantees to the rural poor. In terms of both
total person-days and total households having reached
the 100-day limit, no clear trend is visible, and hence
the overall employment figures (demand, allocation, and
actuals) need to be viewed in perspective. This is because
while these may provide an aggregate picture, the data
in Figure 3 unpacks them in a way that shines greater
light on salient programmatic features prescribed by the
MGNREGA, and by its operational guidelines (Ministry of
Rural Development, 2013).
Therefore, what emerges from the data is that at
least in terms of demand for, allocation of, and actual-
ly undertaken public works at both the household and
individual levels, there has been a largely upward trend
since the NDA took office in 2014. This upward trend
has also been mirrored in rising budgetary allocations.









































































































Figure 2. Total household demand for work, allotted work, and actually worked (a), juxtaposed against total persons
demanded work, allotted work, and actually worked (b). Note: Figures in million Rupees (constructed from data in public
domain). Source: Ministry of Rural Development (2020b).











































































































Figure 3. Total households that reached the 100-day limit (a), juxtaposed against person-days generated (b). Note: Figures
in million Rupees (constructed from data in public domain). Source: Ministry of Rural Development (2020b).
days generated, and the number of households that
reached the 100-day limit, what is unmistakable is that
the BJP-led government, despite its publicly-stated dis-
taste for the ideological basis of the MGNREGA (Pankaj,
2017), has not only retained the programme, but has
overseen its growth. In this article, we explore how
political actors formulated, framed, and re-framed the
MGNREGA in the UPA andNDA dispensations, by unpack-
ing the concept of ‘political will.’ The literature on the
programme to date does not examine the motivations
behind the political framing and re-framing of the pro-
gramme in a structured manner: The focus has largely
been on programme implementation. While there has
been some exploration of the political leadership of the
scheme (Manor & Duckett, 2017), this has used cross-
country comparative analysis across a broader sweep of
national antipoverty programmes, and as such has not
sufficiently examined the case of the MGNREGA itself.
We begin by interrogating the concept of ‘political will’
and reviewing the literature surrounding its usage and
operationalization, as well as the literature on the role
of leadership in the MGNREGA, introducing a frame-
work of ‘developmental leadership’ (Hudson et al., 2018),
which we argue provides for greater explanatory pow-
er by expanding the typical definitions of political will.
Following that, we conclude with a comparison of the
evolution of the MGNREGA under the UPA and the NDA
through the categories proposed by the ‘developmental
leadership’ framework.
2. Interrogating ‘Political Will’
‘Political will’ remains a highly ambiguous concept,
described variously as “the slipperiest concept in the
policy lexicon,” and the “the sine qua non of policy
success which is never defined except by its absence”
(Hammergren, 1998, p. 12). It has been frequently used
in the Indian context, ranging from leading bankers
attributing the sclerotic pace of economic reforms to
the lack of ‘political will’ to undertake them (“Lack of
political will,” 2014), to the requirement of ‘political will’
to reduce India’s neonatal mortality rates (“Save our
babies,” 2018), as well as to the centrality of ‘political
will’ in the implementation of India’s family planning pro-
gramme (Gwatkin, 1979). The ambiguity in its meaning
lends value to the term as political rhetoric, since in the
absence of a clear causal diagnosis, policy failure can be
conveniently labelled as a failure of ‘political will’ (Post,
Raile, & Raile, 2010). Nevertheless, there is no consen-
sus as to what constitutes ‘political will’ in each of these
cases, and while the role of ‘political will’ can be seen
to be relevant in the popular imagination for the success
or failure of any government programme or scheme, a
structured examination of the term is necessary to oper-
ationalise it.
At times, ‘political will’ is defined in a markedly
individual actor-driven manner based on commitment,
intent or willingness, such as by the UK’s erstwhile
Department for International Development (2004, p. 1),
which considered it “the determination of an individ-
ual political actor to do and say things that will pro-
duce a desired outcome.” The origins of this understand-
ing of ‘political will’ can be traced to Kpundeh (1998,
p. 92), who argued that it is the “demonstrated cred-
ible intent of political actors to attack perceived caus-
es or effects…at a systematic level,” and to Brinkerhoff
(2000, p. 242), who proposed that it is the “commit-
ment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set
of objectives…and to sustain the costs of those actions
over time.” Individual-centric notions of political will are
echoed by Anderson, Branchflower, Moreno-Torres, and
Besançon (2005), who consider it to bewillingness which
can be assessed by commitment and inclusiveness, and
Rose and Greeley (2006, p. 5), who argued that it is
the “sustained commitment of politicians and adminis-
trators to invest political resources to achieve specific
objectives.” One of the principal precedents of ‘politi-
cal will’ that have been suggested in the Department
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for International Development (2004, p. 1) are imagina-
tion on the part of the politician or policymaker, that
is “some capacity to envision how things might be dif-
ferent.” Personality traits and styles have an impact
on the choices made by leaders, and to understand
them, and the pathways they enable, there is a need
to delve into the psychology of leaders and the man-
ner in which it motivates them to pursue developmental
change (Corbett, 2019).
‘Political will’ can also be understood at a collec-
tive level, with Brinkerhoff (2007) linking the term to
state capacity by arguing that the fundamental nature
of capacity development is as an “endogenous process
that engages not just the abilities and skills, but the
motivation, support, and aspirations of people” (p. 111),
or in other words, the “ownership and/or political will”
(p. 112), although cautioning that “it is problematic
to accurately identify ownership and political will, and
to differentiate these two volitional components from
capacity questions” (p. 112). Chopra (2015), while focus-
ing on the MGNREGA’s performance in terms of its
implementation across four states, builds upon a polit-
ical economy perspective in which institutions, actors
and incentives are delineated (Mcloughlin & Batley,
2012), and the role of politics is considered crucial
(Leftwich &Wheeler, 2011). In this vein, Chopra extends
Brinkerhoff (2000)’s framework for understanding the
commitment of actors involved in programme implemen-
tation,which consists of twoprincipal elements—‘action’
and ‘intention.’ Similarly, Post et al. (2010) attempt
an expanded understanding of political will by includ-
ing “incentives or disincentives” (p. 655), “bargaining
mechanisms” (p. 664), “credibility…(based on reputa-
tional costs)” (p. 660), and “political or social institutions
or…aspects of human behaviour” (p. 655) as key deter-
minants. Moreover, Andrews, McConnell, and Wescott
(2010) suggest in their work on leadership-led change
that the acceptance of change, granting authority for
change, and introducing or freeing the abilities neces-
sary to achieve change, are crucial, and that leadership
is therefore more about collective rather than individu-
al action.
Post et al. (2010, p. 658) in a similar vein describe
the conceptual components of ‘political will’ by extract-
ing three categories of the conceptual components of
‘political will’ through an examination of the previous
definitions of the complex, multifaceted term. These
include (1) the “distribution of preferences with regard
to the outcome of interest,” the (2) “authority, capaci-
ty, and legitimacy of key decision makers or reformers,”
and (3) the extent of “commitment to preferences” with
regard to the policy action in question. In this sense ‘polit-
ical will’ requires enough people in positions of power
who support the policy or programme in question, and
an insufficient number of veto players who may poten-
tially block or derail it (Roberts, 2017), which assumes
greater significance in large democracies like India where
there are “typically more complex arrays of supporters
and veto players” (Roberts, 2017). The intensity of the
policymakers’ commitment to supporting a policy or pro-
gramme therefore hinges upon factors ranging from their
most influential constituencies, the pressure groups lob-
bying them and the intensity of their preferences in turn,
the ideological underpinnings as implicit in their par-
ty membership, as well as larger cultural preferences
(Roberts, 2017), thereby marking the importance of col-
lective interests.
Hudson et al. (2018, p. 8) have recently argued that:
The key to opening the black box of political will lies
in the interaction between institutions and individu-
als, or structures and agents, [and]…requires a move
froma static and reductionist viewof institutions initi-
ated and sustained by ‘politicalwill,’ to amore dynam-
ic and temporal view of politics as a process of contes-
tation to establish the ‘collective will.’
What emerges from the multiple definitions of ‘political
will’ that have been discussed in this section is that there
are essentially three categories or levels which might be
described as the (1) individual, the (2) collective, and
the (3) societal. Even though the literature, as distilled
above discusses what can be termed the individual and
the collective levels quite extensively, the societal aspect
is somewhat less well-articulated.
This definition holds that ‘political will’ depends on
the developmental (positive) leadership of motivated
individuals with the values, interests and opportunity to
influence change, as well as their ability to overcome
barriers to cooperation and form coalitions with power,
legitimacy, and influence, while these coalitions’ power
and effectiveness partly hinges on their ability to con-
test and de-legitimise one set of ideas and legitimize an
alternative set (Hudson et al., 2018). However, “typically,
though not exclusively, [this] involves a process of active
contestation where various stakeholders within society
enter into debate and conflict—though not necessarily
violence” (Hudson et al., 2018, p. 9) over distributional
consequences, as well as the fairness of outcomes con-
cerning existing or proposed institutional rules, or both
(Beetham, 1991; Mcloughlin, 2015). It is argued that it
is the “outcome of this political process of contestation
[which] is that leaders and coalitions accrue power to
reformulate institutions in ways that are perceived as
locally legitimate and sustainable” (Hudson et al., 2018,
p. 12). We use this three-level conceptual framework to
explore the puzzle of themaintenance and growth of the
MGNREGA under the NDA.
3. Comparing the MGNREGA under the UPA and NDA
3.1. Motivations of Individuals
The centre-left UPA government, led by the Congress,
and supported through a confidence-and-supply
arrangement with the Left Front parties until 2008, came
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to power in May 2004 after winning the 2004 Indian
general election, dislodging the previous BJP-led NDA
government which was in power from 1998 to 2004.
The idea of an employment guarantee had been an
important feature of the Congress’s 2004 election man-
ifesto which made an explicit policy commitment by
way of the MGNREGA (Indian National Congress, 2004).
The Congress president, Sonia Gandhi, widely expected
to assume the premiership following her party’s election
victory, in a surprise move, relinquished the position of
prime minister to Manmohan Singh, her key lieutenant
and former Indian finance minister in prime minister PV
Narasimha Rao’s cabinet from 1991 to 1996. Singh was
credited for his leadership and technocratic finesse in
spearheading the crucial economic reforms that liber-
alised India’s economy in 1991 in the face of a loom-
ing and potentially debilitating balance-of-payments cri-
sis, heralding an end to India’s ‘Licence-Permit Raj,’ as
its complex web of bureaucratic controls was popularly
described, and implementing a simultaneous across-the-
board reduction of import tariffs (Baru, 2014).
While Singh was chosen to preside over the central
government, Sonia Gandhi would chair the UPA, as well
as the National Advisory Council (NAC), the latter con-
sisting of members who, while designing the MGNREGA,
utilised ideas generated by “prolonged encounters in
Rajasthan state between civil society organisations and
state governments (some of which were Congress-led)”
(Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 308). This dual model was
partly due to Sonia Gandhi not being “intimately famil-
iar with administrative matters,” yet being motivated
in the policies that emerged from the NAC she chaired
to go “much further than previous Congress govern-
ments in addressing poverty, [since] she regarded them
as efforts to lend substance to the dynasty’s claims to
be progressive” (Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 318). These
efforts stemmed from her experience of observing from
close quarters her mother-in-law, prime minister Indira
Gandhi’s “(mostly empty) promises to tackle poverty”
and what has been described by some observers as her
husband, prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s “inept and con-
fused” leadership, throughout which she “had acquaint-
ed [herself] with the progressive rhetoric of the Congress
Party” (Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 317–318).
The MGNREGA:
Formed the cornerstone of the shift in the UPA’s
approach to development towards universaliza-
tion and entitlements, articulated in the National
Common Minimum Programme which committed
the different constituent political parties of the coali-
tion towards delivering on the basis of a cohesive
policy framework. (Krishna, 2019, p. 9)
Even as the Congress party:
Exercised great power within the ruling coalition that
it led between 2004 and 2014…it was allied to many
(mainly regional) parties, some of which had only
limited interest in poverty initiatives…[and] Prime
Minister Singh and some of his key colleagues were
sceptical and eventually even hostile to certain pover-
ty programmes that Congress leader Sonia Gandhi
supported. (Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 309)
Over a long academic and bureaucratic career, Singh
had served as chief economic advisor, secretary in
the finance ministry, Reserve Bank of India governor,
Planning Commission deputy chairman, and later in poli-
tics as finance minister and leader of the opposition in
the upper house of Parliament. Baru (2014) describes
Singh as enthusiastically receiving the scheme once it
reached his office through the NAC. However, in line
with his background and technocratic motivations, he
“resisted demands for linking wages in the [MGNREGA]
to a minimum wage and wage indexation” (Singh, 2014),
even though, owing to the nature of his relationship with
the NAC chair, he acquiesced to the NAC’s demands.
The centre-right BJP-led NDA government came to
power in May 2014, and installed Narendra Modi, who
had till then served as chief minister of the western
Indian state of Gujarat, as primeminister. Individually far
less committed to the MGNREGA, Modi, and arguably
most of the BJP cadres, lent very little personal ideo-
logical support to the MGNREGA, as exemplified by the
prime minister’s remarks on the floor of the Lok Sabha,
the lower House of Parliament, which betray his lack of
‘political will,’ that he would keep the MGNREGA alive as
a ‘living monument’ of the failures of the Congress for
making people dig holes after 60 years of Independence
(Joshua& Sriram, 2015). This served the dual objective of
indicating his ideological distaste for the scheme, while
leaving open the option of retaining it if necessary.
3.2. Collective Action
The NAC was a body formed to oversee the implemen-
tation of the National Common Minimum Programme
which consisted of “various distinguished professionals
drawn from diverse fields of development activity,” and
was “envisaged…as a form of interface with civil society
and government, thereby positioning this party-political
domain as having a window in civil society and parlia-
mentary domains” (Chopra, 2011, p. 160). Manor and
Duckett (2017, p. 312) outline how “progressive intellec-
tuals and civil society leaders [were in] potent roles in the
policy-making process for the first time—most notably in
the NAC that Sonia Gandhi chaired,” as well as the impor-
tant role of “progressive bureaucrats.” Chiriyankadanth,
Maiorano, Manor, and Tillin (2020) describe the bound-
aries between different actors as being blurred, with sev-
eral activists, as well as bureaucrats, both then retired as
well as currently occupying official policymaking roles at
the time, being members of the NAC.
It elicited opposition from the central government
itself over the MGNREGA’s perceived fiscal irresponsi-
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bility, in view of its high annual expenditures which
would typically constitute around 1 percent of Indian
GDP (Zimmermann, 2013). During and after its formula-
tion, contestation emerged over the MGNREGA in the
form of the differences between the prime minister’s
office and the finance ministry on the one hand, and the
NACon the other as “relatedmainly to the financial impli-
cations of the programmewith estimates of howmuch it
would cost the exchequer varying from 1 to 3 percent of
national income” (Baru, 2014, p. 142), with neither the
prime minister nor the finance minister agreeing to an
open-ended fiscal commitment given that the “benefits
of the programme were to be based on self-selection”
(Baru, 2014, p. 142). Conservative industrialists and
landowners’ “anxieties about heavy expenditures were
shared by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and offi-
cials in the finance ministry and helped to trigger cuts
in the outlay for several poverty programmes, including
the MGNREGA, in 2013–2014” (Manor & Duckett, 2017,
p. 313). The MGNREGA was envisioned as a ‘targeted’
programme in which rather than being dependent on
an administrator to choose the beneficiaries, the pro-
gramme “expects beneficiaries to select themselves by
creating incentives so that only the poor will participate
in the scheme,” even though this self-selection or self-
targeting mechanism is weak in instances of low aware-
ness and theMGNREGAwage outstripping the prevailing
market wage (Shankar & Gaiha, 2013).
However, such criticism is tempered in view of the
self-targeting mechanism’s lack of incentive creation for
misuse, “in that nonpoor people are unlikely to demand
such work” (Dutta et al., 2014, p. xxiii). Moreover, pro-
cedural criticism over the NAC’s structure and the dis-
proportionate power it wielded needs to be viewed in
perspective, with Chopra (2011) highlighting how these
institutional mechanisms created much-needed further
space for multiple actors and institutions to interact
and exercise power during the formulation processes
of the MGNREGA, ranging from activists and civil soci-
ety networks like the People’s Action for Employment
Guarantee, to actors belonging to a variety of politi-
cal parties and trade unions, with the NAC effective-
ly being formed as a coalition of motivated individuals.
TheMGNREGA is a case which highlights that firstly, pow-
er is diffuse and has multiple sites where it is exercised;
and secondly, that power works through complex and
iterative ways, with overlaps in actors, the flow of infor-
mation, and the congregative activities of the parliamen-
tary, executive, party-political, and civil society domains,
adding to the “complex and messy nature of policy for-
mulation” (Chopra, 2011, p. 167).
Despite the UPA government being led by the centre-
left Congress, it has been argued that the MGNREGA,
when passed in 2005, was not entirely influenced by the
neoliberal bent of an important segment of the execu-
tive leadership at the time. The role of the Left has been
described by Chopra (2011, p. 162) as “intricately bound
up with civil society actors as well as other stakeholders
involved in the formulation processes, in addition to their
explicit role in the parliamentary and executive domains.”
This reflected the fact that broader political alliances
shaped theprogramme,with a firmbasis in compromises
as a result of differing ideas and political ideology. After
the 2004 Indian general election, theUPAwould not have
been able to secure a majority without the Left Front
parties’ support, chief among them the Communist Party
of India (Marxist), since forming a government is depen-
dent on securing the support ofmore than half of the par-
liamentarians in the Lok Sabha. In such a context, the Left
Front wielded ‘disproportionate’ influence over UPA poli-
cies until such time as they decided to discontinue their
support to the UPA government following reservations
over the terms of the Indo–US Civil Nuclear Agreement
in 2008 (Krishna, 2019). The route for exercising this influ-
ence was through interventions during the negotiations
of the UPA–Left coordination Committee, an inherently
‘party-political’ process (Chopra, 2011). At an ideologi-
cal level, this party-political process was buoyed by sev-
eral left-leaning actors in civil society and NAC process-
es, despite their lacking explicit Left Front party mem-
berships (Chopra, 2011). Moreover, the UPA’s alliance
partners such as the Rashtriya Janata Dal, a regional par-
ty based in the northern Indian state of Bihar, supplied
politicians such as Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, the union
minister for rural development from 2004 to 2009, who
acted as the “bridge between the [UPA’s] fiscal conser-
vatives and the populists” through his own personal net-
works and relationships (Baru, 2014, p. 142).
Since 2014, the BJP commanded a parliamentary
majority in the Lok Sabha of its own accord and was
logically “less beholden to [its] coalition partners [in
the NDA] in formulating its policies” and programmes,
which would reduce both accountability and collective
constraints (Krishna, 2019, p. 9). Aiyar (2018) argues
that since 2014, the NDA government has also exhibit-
ed strong signs of excessive centralisation of power in
the Prime Minister’s Office, with line ministries in direct
contact with local district magistrates to tightly moni-
tor implementation targets. This trend, coupled with the
prime minister’s highly personalised, charismatic leader-
ship style, has also compromised the federal structure
of governance and the attendant state-specific priorities
and social policy innovation, and “increased activity has
not been complemented by increased capacity and as
districts lurch from one target to another, they have little
time for monitoring quality” (Aiyar, 2018).
Moreover, the NDA “placed technology at the heart
of its policy agenda, onboarding the UPA’s Direct Benefit
Transfer approach early on through its JanDhan-Aadhaar-
Mobile” trinity platform, essentially a troika of free bank
accounts for all beneficiaries, a unique identification
number, and mobile phone connectivity to streamline
service delivery “with a view tomigrating towards a cash-
based welfare setup” (Krishna, 2019, p. 9). Such a Direct
Benefit Transfer-centric approach has been described by
commentators as an approach to gloss over, rather than
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overtly address, the “roots” of core governance “delivery
failure” like “complex procedures, weak human resource,
[and] poor training” (Aiyar, 2018).
3.3. Societal Contestation and Deliberation
The NAC allowed for the inclusion of several civil soci-
ety activists in the process of creating the first draft of
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill (Chopra,
2011). However, the influence and freedom that the
NAC gained in crafting the UPA government’s policies
and programmes, stemming from what was perceived
to be Sonia Gandhi’s supreme authority in the politi-
cal landscape of the country during the UPA years, also
elicited criticisms of acting as an extra-constitutional
authority. Through the media, this complex power equa-
tion led to widespread public discourse, leading to both
the contestation and legitimation of, at a societal level,
ideas of what constitutes legitimate politics and suitable
social policy.
The MGNREGA was prominent among the legisla-
tions enacted between 2004 and 2009, the UPA’s first full
term in office, which included the Right to Information
Act, 2005, and the Recognition of Forest Rights Act, 2006,
among others. Electoral analysts have argued that with
a seemingly “correct reading of the effects of economic
reforms and the deployment of the aamadami [Hindi for
‘common man’] language in 2004, a series of pro-people
legislative and policy initiatives [such as the MGNREGA]”
(Yadav & Palshikar, 2009, p. 42) partly contributed to
the Congress leading yet another coalition government
at the centre with a considerably enhanced mandate.
Manmohan Singh became the first prime minister after
the inaugural holder of the office, Jawaharlal Nehru, to
be re-elected after a full five-year term. According to
Manor and Duckett (2017, p. 307), the UPA’s election vic-
tory in 2004 had beenmistakenly attributed in themedia
to a “revolt among the rural poor against the policies of
the previous BJP-led government.” However:
The UPA set out to make that myth a reality at the
next election, [and] had some success in achieving
that, although that was also over-stated in media
assessments in 2009…[with] its poverty initiatives,
only someofwhich succeeded, [adding] up to a decid-
edly innovative approach. (Manor, 2011, as cited in
Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 307)
Even though its impact on the UPA’s victory in 2009 was
partially attributable to the MGNREGA, it still consider-
ably raised the costs of its discontinuation or dilution,
thereby leading to a reasonable degree of institution-
al lock-in.
The media had “erroneously claimed that [the
MGNREGA] won re-election for the ruling alliance in
2009, but it helped to ensure a majority that would sur-
vive until 2014 when scandals and political blunders sent
it down to a severe election defeat” (Manor, 2011, as
cited in Manor & Duckett, 2017, p. 320). As the second
term of the UPA government (2009 to 2014) grappled
with allegations of corruption, extant problems with the
scheme, such as states reneging on their employment-
provision commitments, wages being “delayed and with-
held,” and “a lack of proper social auditing and moni-
toring” resulting in corruption (Freud, 2015, p. 3), “were
exacerbated by theUPA’s overall image of policy paralysis
and inaction” (Krishna, 2019, p. 9). During the UPA’s sec-
ond term it began ‘dilly-dallying’ with the idea of Direct
Benefit Transfer programmes, in the run up to the 2014
parliamentary elections (Pankaj, 2017), and essentially
set the scene for re-framing the MGNREGA towards a
cash transfer-based setup which the NDA built upon fur-
ther from2014 onwards. TheUPA proceeded to re-frame
the scheme in this direction without first addressing the
acute capacity and access-related concerns surrounding
the delivery mechanisms of such an approach. While
Manmohan Singh as prime minister had:
Persuaded cabinet colleagues in 2010 to make a
change in the rules governing India’s MGNREGA
that undermined efforts by actors at lower levels
to siphon off funds from the programme…by con-
trast, he permitted cuts in funds for that same pro-
gramme after 2011 (which…contributed to his par-
ty’s defeat at the 2014 election). (Manor & Duckett,
2017, p. 322)
The ‘cynical’ process of ‘starving’ theMGNREGAof essen-
tial funds had begun in 2010 itself, through placing a cap
on the funding allocated, which led to issues with paying
wages and providing employment (Ghosh, 2015).
Despite its “pro-business and investment-oriented”
framing, evident in its national-level drive to push such
a narrative with initiatives such as “Make in India, Skill
India, and Start-up India…as opposed to the ‘entitle-
ments’ and ‘rights’-oriented framework reminiscent of
the Congress” (Krishna, 2019, p. 9), the NDA government
has not abandoned the programme and budgetary allo-
cations to it have seen a largely upward trend since it
took office. Although simultaneously, the NDA has re-
framed the MGNREGA’s emphasis towards ‘asset cre-
ation’ driven by targets and often in a ‘top-down’ or cen-
tralised manner (Pankaj, 2017), the ‘polar opposite’ of
the UPA’s conceptualization of theMGNREGA, which had
pursued a “demand-driven job creation regime focused
on participatory decentralised development” (Pankaj,
2017, as cited in Krishna, 2019, p. 9).
Therefore, important differences emerge in the for-
mulation and framing of the MGNREGA between the
NDA and the UPA, with the former responding to soci-
etal expectations of its declared ideological approach
towards poverty programming by not mentioning the
MGNREGA in its 2014 election manifesto, a programme
towards which it maintains what is described by some
observers as a ‘hostile attitude’ (Gowda & Batra, 2019).
The attendant re-framing by the NDA has been captured
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by Pankaj (2017) as tweaking the MGNREGA towards
becoming ‘asset-focused’ against ‘wage-focussed,’ and
‘target-focussed’ at the cost of ‘demand-focussed’ which
compromised its original emphasis on promoting ‘par-
ticipatory decentralised development’ as envisaged by
the UPA. Such ‘asset fetishism’ has disproportionate-
ly skewed the scheme’s benefits towards agriculturists
at the expense of landless labour, which has affected
employment generation (Pankaj, 2017). “The UPA had
prioritised job-creation over asset-creation by mandat-
ing a wage-material expenditure ratio of 60:40” (Pankaj,
2017, as cited in Krishna, 2019, p. 9), and mandated
that four out of the eight works that the scheme cov-
ered are to be related to more labour-intensive work,
with the remaining fourworks related to labour-intensive
asset creation (Pankaj, 2017; Pawariya, 2017). Despite
the NDA expressing:
Its intent to change the ratio of expenditure between
labour and material from the current 60:40 applica-
ble at the gram panchayat level to 51:49 applicable
at the district level…[it] decided to maintain a 60:40
wage—material ratio at the district level…to ensure
[the] creation of good quality assets in rural areas.
(“MGNREGA wage-material ratio,” 2016)
While noting that public policy and the nature and choice
of development programmes pursued are not regime-
neutral, Pankaj (2017) also illustrates that the NDA
quelled ‘lurking uncertainty’ around theMGNREGA’s con-
tinuation by attributing changes in the programme to
itself, and declaring it:
A programme of “national pride and celebration” on
the occasion of 10 years of its completion…[with
then] Union Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, [empha-
sising] that “transformation has been brought in the
implementation of this Scheme,” asserting further
that the scheme is not “cast in stone.” (“Modi govern-
ment praises,” 2016, as cited in Pankaj, 2017, p. 61)
4. Conclusions
In the Indian context, “most political parties…(with the
exception of the communists) are founded not on a
strong economic ideology but on notions of culture and
identity—national, regional, ethnic, caste-based or lin-
guistic” (Kotwal, Ghatak, & Ghosh, 2014, p. 41), and
“there is a lack of a one-to-one mapping between eco-
nomic and social ideologies on either side of the politi-
cal spectrum” (Krishna, 2019, p. 9). Kotwal et al. (2014,
pp. 41–42) argue that:
Positions on economic policy are usually a deriva-
tive, influenced by vote bank calculations or the need
to attract funds for election campaigns. Since poli-
cy choices do not arise from deep ideological com-
mitments to preferred economic paradigms, they are
often incoherent, shifting and lacking in the sort
of essence that may qualify for labels like socialist
or libertarian.
The political origin of antipoverty programmes has been
based in “pragmatic calculations about [parties’] politi-
cal utility,” and even as “socialist or progressive ideals
long espoused by ruling parties played a part, in [coun-
tries like] India, their time-honoured rhetorical commit-
ments to socialist or social democratic ideals had not pre-
viously been translated into much robust action (Manor
&Duckett, 2017, pp. 310–311). “While lying on twooppo-
site ends of the political spectrum, the Congress and the
BJP have followed broadly the same paths in the pursuit
of neoliberal policy” (Pankaj, 2017, as cited in Krishna,
2019, p. 9), even though the Congress has adhered to
the cautious, reforms-by-stealth route as opposed to
what has been described as the BJP’s faster and bold-
er approach (Pankaj, 2017). Manor and Duckett (2017,
p. 311) argue that:
[The] traditional social democratic posturing of the
Congress Party (including Indira Gandhi’s promise to
‘abolish poverty’), which had seldom been matched
by substantive action, was again treated as a point of
origin and was given substance for the first time.
Both the Congress and the BJP consider high rates of GDP
growth to be synonymous with development, and while
the Congress concedes to the need for state interven-
tion in social sector development, the BJP subscribes to
a trickle-down approach (Pankaj, 2017).
Considering these differences, the BJP has re-framed
the programme away from the Congress’s preference for
a universal approach with the nationwide implementa-
tion of the MGNREGA, and away from a mixed portfolio
of cash and kind transfers towards more targeted cash-
based assistance (Pankaj, 2017). Despite the BJP’s ideo-
logical aversion to the scheme, and a heightened propen-
sity for veto players to exercise their derailment agenda,
the institutional lock-in for the MGNREGA had already
occurred. At a societal level, theMGNREGA’s provision of
incomeas a right in rural areas raised the political costs of
the scheme’s discontinuation or dilution. While one may
have expected the cessation of the programme on ideo-
logical grounds, in fact the BJP has been unable to repeal
in order to avoid electoral ramifications, particularly in
rural areas. Budgetary allocations to the MGNREGA by
the BJP, as well as employment indicators at the individu-
al and household levels have seen largely upward trends
since 2014.
Even though individual-level distaste for the
MGNREGA may persist in the BJP, as evident in prime
minister Narendra Modi’s “making people dig holes”
remark in parliament, the BJP has collectively identified
the incentives for its retention. At an individual level,
key UPA leaders and NAC members, from the top-down,
were personally and openly committed to the idea of
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 168–179 176
the MGNREGA, as demonstrated throughout the 2004
general election campaign and the Congress’ manifesto.
The NAC emerged as the site of collective deliberation
for a coalition of motivated individuals, who hailed from
a broadly similar ideological persuasion and therefore
displayed a certain cohesion which helped resolve party-
political differences between UPA allies.
With ideological commitment and programme for-
mulation in relatively greater synchronisation, societal
norms were shaped effectively, particularly in rural India,
leading to the ‘locking-in’ of the programme which at
the societal level formed a rights-based social contract
with a concomitant expectation created for its retention
(Chopra, 2014). As a result, despite individual and politi-
cal contestation by theNDA, theMGNREGAwas retained,
although re-framed to better reflect the BJP’s ideologi-
cal approach towards poverty programming, the stage
for which was partly set by the UPA in its second term
by linking Direct Benefit Transfers with the MGNREGA.
Therefore, while as a blanket term, ‘political will’ does
not really explain much, expanding and reconceptualis-
ing its definition by analysing leadership at the individ-
ual, collective, and societal levels, helps illuminate the
drivers behind the formulation, retention, framing, and
re-framing of the scheme.
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